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Abstract. An RFID tag could change hands many times during its
lifetime. In a retail chain, the ownership of the tag is instituted by the
supplier who initially owns the tag. In the view of a buyer, the validity
of the current tag ownership and the originality of supplier are most important. In typical RFID ownership transfer protocols, the knowledge of
the tag’s authentication key proves the ownership. However, it is insufficient against an active attacker, since tags are usually lack of tamperproof protections. Ownership transfer relies on a successful verification
of tag’s supplier and current ownership. In this paper, we formally define
the security model of ownership transfer protocols and propose a secure
ownership transfer protocol. In our scheme, current owner provides a
new owner with the evidence of transfer and a proof of tag origin. Key
management becomes easy in our system, since the one asymmetric verification key of the owner can be used to verify multiple tags that belong
to the owner.

1

Introduction

A basic RFID system comprises three components: RFID reader, RFID tag,
and backend database. RFID has exhibited many practical applications such as
serving as identity of an object in supply chains, supermarkets and hospitals. A
tag attached to a product has a unique identifier stored in its backend database.
In practice, a product (with a tag) is owned by a user. Often, the product needs
to change hands due to selling or buying. This process is referred to as ownership
transfer.
In the lifetime of a tag, its ownership is likely to be transferred from one owner
to another. An ownership transfer protocol runs between the current owner and
the new owner. Generally speaking, the protocol is considered in two phases,
?
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namely ownership verification and ownership transfer. A new owner firstly verifies the current ownership of the tag. If the current ownership is confirmed, he
can request the ownership transfer. After a successful ownership transfer, the
current owner who becomes the previous owner of the tag can no longer access
the tag and the new owner who becomes the current owner of the tag can prove
the ownership of the tag. According to the current ownership of the tag, a user
can be a previous owner, current owner or new owner of the tag.
The security of RFID ownership transfer protocols is considered in threefold:
the secure ownership, exclusive ownership and secure ownership transfer [3].
The first two are related to the phase of the ownership verification. Informally,
they guarantee that the actual owner always has the ownership of a tag and no
others can simultaneously obtain the ownership. The criteria of secure ownership
transfer evaluates the phase of the tag ownership transfer. A new user who is
unauthorized by the current owner cannot gain the ownership of the tag. A
secure ownership transfer protocol should satisfy all these requirements.
The traditional RFID ownership transfer protocols are based on the lightweight
symmetric key authentication schemes. The backend server and a tag share a
predefined symmetric key and the tag’s identity. The tag’s ownership is checked
by implementing the authentication protocol. However, most (passive) tags are
not tamper-resistant, so that adversaries can launch active attacks. It is possible to physically corrupt or clone a tag and obtain the internal state. Once
the internal state is leaked, the adversary can control the tag as the real owner.
Therefore, it can prove the ownership and even transfer the tag to others.
1.1

Motivation

The aim of this paper is to propose a secure RFID ownership transfer protocol. In
most previous RFID ownership transfer protocols, the proof of ownership relies
on the knowledge of the tag’s authentication key. If the user can provide a valid
secret key, the verifier accepts its ownership of the tag. While it is insufficient
against the attacker who compromises the tag. In practice, we call the party who
currently owns the tag as a seller and the party who receives the ownership as a
buyer. The symmetric authentication key shared between the seller and the tag
provides no identity information of the seller. Anyone who has the key is able to
prove the ownership and transfer it to other parties. It may injure the rights of
seller and buyer. As a buyer, it usually concerns the origin of the product and
the validity of the seller. He expects to check them during a purchase. The key
management in large RFID system is also an issue. A tag normally requires a
unique key for proving the ownership. The buyer has to obtain a large number
of keys to check ownerships of tags. It not only requires a secure channel in
communication, but also hard to maintain the records of these transactions. It
would be desirable that one verification key can do the job. With this key, anyone
can verify the ownership of tags that belong to the owner.
We look into an RFID system, where a supplier obtains products from a
manufacturer. The supplier authorizes the manufacturer, via a warrant, to make
specific products. After the products are ready for the supplier, the manufacturer
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setups RFID tags and attaches them to products, respectively. When a buyer
purchases the product from the supplier, the ownership transfer is required. The
buyer checks the information of supplier and the product prior to making a
payment. Once the deal is complete, the buyer owns the tag and supplier can
no longer claim the ownership. Meanwhile, the seller provides the undeniable
transfer proof which includes the information of seller, buyer and tag. The buyer
can also resell the product in the future. One aim in this paper is to construct
an ownership transfer scheme in this scenario.
Symmetric key based protocols are insufficient to reach a strong security level
for ownership transfer protocols. It is a challenge to resist an active attack. We
assume that the tag authentication can be done by using a traditional RFID authentication protocol, while we only focus on the ownership transfer protocol. An
owner is usually a powerful entity which can perform public key cryptographic
algorithms for ownership transfer, which does not rely on the computation power
of tag.
1.2

Our Contributions

In this paper, we enhance the security of ownership transfer protocols by considering some strong attacks, such as the replacement attacks. In our model, the
ability of an adversary is assumed by allowing more oracle queries. A formal
definition of security model is given in this paper. An RFID ownership transfer
protocol which is secure against the presented model is proposed. We consider
a chain of the ownership transfers. It guarantees the actual ownership even if
the internal state of the tag is disclosed. The protocol prevents an unauthorized
owner from transferring the ownership to another. In other words, the validity of
the current owner is verified during the ownership transfer. As a feature of our
protocol, instead of using different authentication key to check the ownership
of each tag, a buyer can use the seller’s public key to check the all the tags.
We analyse the security of proposed ownership transfer protocol and provide a
formal security proof.

2

Related Work

Saito, Imamoto and Sakurai [13] introduced an ownership transfer protocol using
two approaches. Both provide the privacy and security protection of the current
owner and the new owner. One is based on the three-party model and the other is
on two-party model. Since the schemes are based on symmetric key cryptographic
algorithms, the secret key of tag is pre-shared with the owner. In the three-party
model, the second key is shared between the trusted third party (TTP) and the
tag. In ownership transfer, the TTP helps the new owner to update the tag’s new
secret. While the online TTP is required during the ownership transfer. Once
the tag is compromised, the shared secret key between the tag and the TTP is
also disclosed.
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Independently, Molnar, Soppera and Wagner [9] proposed an ownership transfer protocol of RFID tags. The protocol addresses the privacy problems of ownership transfer through the pseudonym. The proposed scheme employs a tree
based key structure to enable the time-limited delegation for temporarily ownership transfer. It is that the current owner can temporarily delegate the ownership
of the tag to another party. After a period of time, the ownership is returned to
the original owner without the agreement of the delegatee. However, the scheme
needs a counter which is in the non-volatile memory to count the number of
authentications. A Trusted Center (TC) who controls all the secret of tags assists the readers to authenticate the tag. Unfortunately, most trusted third party
based ownership transfer protocols [6, 8, 11, 9] suffer from the similar issues as in
[13].
Several security properties of ownership transfer protocols were introduced
by Ng, Susilo, Mu and Safavi-Naini [10], where they introduced four new properties: tag assurance, current ownership proof, undeniable ownership transfer
and owner initiation. The proposed scheme satisfies most security properties of
ownership transfer while only some hash calculations are required on the tag.
Elkhiyaoui, Blass and Molva [4] presented the problem of issuer verification during the ownership transfer. In this paper, the privacy and security of ownership
transfer protocols are formally defined and the proposed scheme achieves the
constant time authentication. The scheme prevents the attacker from injecting
fake tags in the supply chains. The origin of the tag is verified prior to the
transfer. Abyaneh [2] shows that the forward and backward privacy are broken
if the attacker was an owner of the tag. Additionally, the definition of the security model does not allow the adversary to rewrite the tag’s content. It may be
vulnerable against some active attacks.
A scalable authentication protocol which supports the ownership transfer was
proposed in [5]. The protocol provides the controlled delegation without using
the non-volatile memory to store a counter. The feature of desynchronization
engages the protocol runs without the TTP. It employs a table which consists
of two hash chains to identify a tag. While, the cost of storage on the server is
questionable when the maximum size of the hash chains increased. Meanwhile,
it also suffers form the denial-of-service attack.
Deursen, Mauw, Radomirović and Vullers [3] introduced a formal definition
of secure ownership transfer in RFID systems. They described two roles: the
tag owner and the tag holder. Basically, both of them can pass the ownership
test but only the owner is engaged to transfer the ownership. It was claimed
that the tag owner and holder are coincide in the notion of secure ownership.
However, the holder of the tag may not be the owner in decentralized systems.
Since the security of ownership is based on the authentication of the tag, most
symmetric-key ownership transfer protocols [14, 13, 9, 12] assume that the tag is
incorruptible. In [10] and [4], a tag is allowed to be compromised. Nevertheless,
the content of the tag cannot be rewrite after the adversary disclosed the key.
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5

System Model

In this section, we formally define the ownership transfer protocols using the
retail chain as an instance.
3.1

Entities

– Tag Ti : An object is attached by one tag T . The tag has a small memory
which stores the current state si of the tag. Ti is a low-cost device which can
at most calculate the hash function F .
– Manufacturer Mi : The manufacturer is the one who makes the products
for suppliers. One manufacturer can cooperate with many different suppliers
while the product must be authorized by the specific supplier.
– Supplier Si : The supplier is the one who sales the products to customers. It
handles the first ownership transfer of the tag. The supplier authorizes the
manufacturer to produce expected number of products meanwhile S provides
a unique warrant for each product.
– Previous Onwer O(ti ,k−1) : The previous owner O(ti ,k−1) is the one who
previously owns the tag Ti at the time k − 1. It provides the proof of transfer
Σ(t,k−1,k) to the current owner.
– Current Owner O(ti ,k) : The current owner O(ti ,k) is the one who currently
owns the tag Ti at the time k. It maintains a database which stores the states
of tags and authenticates tags though a reader Rk . The current owner can
prove the current ownership σ(ti ,k) of the tag and show the valid transfer
obtained from the previous owner. O(ti ,k) is allowed to transfer the current
ownership of Ti to the new owner.
– New Owner O(ti ,k+1) : The new owner O(ti ,k+1) is the one who is a potential
owner of the tag Ti . Prior to accepting the ownership of tag Ti , the new owner
verifies the tag’s supplier S, the previous transfer proof Σ(t,k−1,k) and the
current ownership σ(ti ,k) . It provides an evidence of the acceptance once the
transfer is completed.
Remark 1. The supplier can be considered as a special owner of tag and the
manufacturer is an agent of particular supplier. The previous owner, current
owner and new owner are roles which are changeable in different periods of the
tag ownership. That means the new owner becomes a current owner or previous
owner once he receives or transfers the tag ownership, respectively.
3.2

RFID Ownership Transfer Systems

In our system model, we do not employ the centralized server which is normally
a trusted third party. Instead, we adopt the two-party mode that each party
maintains an isolated database and readers. A party who engages in the ownership transfer is an owner of a tag. From now on, we refer to an owner as an entity
which is supported by RFID readers and a backend database. While one owner
has a public/private key pair where the public key is known to anyone. In the
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model, we only need the secure communication channel during the authentication key exchange. Since the proposed scheme applies symmetric-key based tag
authentication, it is impossible to securely update the key with shared secret [7].
The key update of the protocol should be performed outside the control range
of the previous owner.
The ownership transfer system is described in Fig. 1. Different from the
previous models, we consider the ownership of the tag as a chain. To handle
an ownership transfer, the information of tag’s supplier, previous owner, current
owner and new owner are all required. Nevertheless, only the current owner needs
to provide its secret.
In the model, the ownership transfer stems from the supplier. Let one owner
be a level. Level 0 is the supplier of the tag. The manufacturer generates the
proof of ownership under the supplier’s warrant and stores it on the tag. Anyone
who has the supplier’s public key can verify the ownership of the product. In this
level, the supplier simultaneously plays the role of the previous owner since the
product is brand new. Then, it transfers the ownership to a new owner who is in
level 1. Owner 1 accepts the ownership from the supplier and takes the role of
the current owner. At this time, the supplier transferred the current ownership
but remains the role of supplier and previous owner of the tag. Following the
process, the ownership of the tag is generally in the k-th level.

Manu 1

...

Supplier

Ownership
Transfer

Owner 1

Ownership
Transfer

... Ownership
Transfer

Owner k

Manu n

Fig. 1: Ownership transfer systems

A complete ownership transfer process has two phases: ownership verification
and ownership transfer. In the ownership verification phase, the buyer checks
the supplier of the tag, previous authenticated transfer proof and the validity of
current ownership. Only if all the verifications are successful, two owners play
the game of the ownership transfer. In the completion of an ownership transfer,
the seller outputs a new authenticated transfer proof and the buyer outputs a
proof of new ownership.
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Ownership Transfer Protocols

An RFID ownership transfer protocol consists of seven algorithms: system setup
(Setup), key generation (KeyGen), tag initiation (TagInit), authentication (Auth),
ownership transfer (Transfer), ownership prove (OwnerProve) and ownership verification (OwnerVerify). The seven algorithms in RFID ownership transfer protocols are defined as follows.
– params ← Setup(λ): Taking as input a security parameter λ, outputs a set
of public parameters params.
– (pk, sk) ← KeyGen(params): Taking as input the system parameters params,
outputs a pair of public and private keys (pk, sk).
– (c, σ(t,0) ) ← TagInit(T, pks , sks , pkm , skm ): Taking as input a tag T , a pair
(pks , sks ) of supplier’s public/private keys and a pair (pkm , skm ) of manufacturer’s public/private keys, outputs the tag’s initial state c and ownership
proof σ(t,0) . It runs between a manufacturer and a supplier.
– Inf o ← Auth(T, O(t,k) ): Taking as input a tag T and the current owner
O(t,k) , outputs a set of information Inf o of tag. It runs between the current
owner and the tag.
– Σ(t,k,k+1) ← Transfer(IDt , pks , pkk−1 , pkk , skk+1 , Σ(t,k−1,k) ): Taking as input a tag’s identity IDt , the public key pks of supplier, a pair of public/private key (pkk , skk ) of current owner and a new owner’s public key
pkk+1 , outputs an authenticated transfer proof Σ(t,k,k+1) . It is run by the
current owner.
– σ(t,k) ← OwnerProve(IDt , skk , Σ(t,k−1,k) , σ(t,k−1) ): Taking as input a tag’s
identity IDt , a private key skk of current owner and an authenticated transfer proof Σ(t,k−1,k) , outputs a proof σ(t,k) of ownership. It is run by the
current owner.
– {true, f alse} ← OwnerVerify(IDt , pks , pkk−1 , pkk , σ(t,k) ): Taking as input a
tag’s identity IDt , the supplier’s verification key pks , the previous owner’s
verification key pkk−1 and the current owner’s verification key pkk and a
proof σ(t,k) of ownership, outputs true if the proof is valid, outputs f alse
otherwise.
Without loss of generality, we describe the Auth algorithm in the protocol.
While, it is unnecessary to the security of ownership transfer protocols. In the
paper, Auth is assumed to be a privacy-preserving authentication protocol. The
interaction of one ownership transfer is depicted as in Fig.2.

4

Proposed Protocol

The mathematical preliminaries and concrete construction of the proposed scheme
are presented in the section.
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Tag T

Owner O(t,k+1)

Owner O(t,k)

Query

←−−−−−−−−
Auth()
Response

−−−−−−−−→
Query,Response

−−−−−−−−−−→
Auth()
Owner 0 s poof

←−−−−−−−−−−
OwnerVerify()
Transfer()
OwnerProve()

T ransf er T

←−−−−−−−−→

Transfer()

Fig. 2: Ownership transfer protocol.

4.1

Preliminaries

Bilinear Maps Let G1 , G2 and GT be three multiplicative cyclic groups of same
prime order p. g and h are generators of group G1 and G2 , respectively. The map
e : G1 × G2 → GT is a bilinear mapping (pairing) and (g, h, p, e, G1 , G2 , GT )
is a bilinear group. Let ψ be a computable isomorphism from G2 to G1 that
ψ(h) = g. We say it is a symmetric bilinear group if G = G1 = G2 . A bilinear
pairing satisfies the properties as follows:
– Bilinearity: for all g ∈ G1 , h ∈ G2 and a, b ∈ Z∗p , we have the equation
e(g a , hb ) = e(u, v)ab .
– Non-Degeneracy: for all g ∈ G1 , h ∈ G2 , if g, h are generators respectively,
we have e(g, h) 6= 1 is a generator of GT .
– Efficiency: There is an efficient algorithm to calculate e(g, h) for all g ∈ G1 ,
h ∈ G2 .
Definition 1 (Computational Diffie-Hellman (CDH) assumption). Let
g be a generator of group G1 . Given a tuple < g, g a , g b >, where a, b ∈R Z∗p ,
the CHD problem is to output g ab ∈ G1 . We say that the (, t)-CDH assumption
is hold in G1 , if no t-time algorithm A can solve the CDH problem in G1 with
advantage at least .
4.2

Construction

– Setup: Select a symmetric bilinear paring e : G × G → GT , where the order
of group G and GT are the same p. Let g, h ∈ G be two generators. H1 :
G × {0, 1}∗ → Z∗p , H2 : G × G × {0, 1}∗ → Z∗p and F : {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}l ,
where l is a security parameter, are collision-resistant cryptographic hash
functions. Sets the public parameters params = (G, GT , g, h, p, e, H).
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– KeyGen: Randomly chooses x ∈ Z∗p and sets the public/private key pair as
(pk, sk) = (x, g x ).
– TagInit: Let the public/private key pairs of a manufacturer M and a supplier
respectively be (pkm , skm ) = (x, g x ) and (pks , sks ) = (α, g α ). Firstly, the
manufacturer and the supplier interacts as in Fig.3. The manufacturer generates an ownership proof σ0 for the supplier. It randomly chooses an authentication key y from the key space S and sets the tag state c = (y, F (σ(t,0) ).
The supplier is the owner O(t,0) .

O(t,0) (α, g α )
r ∈R Z∗p

M (x, g x , IDt )

gr

−−−−−−−−−−→
e(t,0) = H2 (g r , g x , IDt )
Y = (g α )e(t,0) g r
Y,IDt

←−−−−−−−−−−
?
(g α )e(t,0) g r =

Y
s = αe(t,0) + r
s

−−−−−−−−−−→
sm = s + x,
σ(t,0) = (u(t,0) , v(t,0) , w(t,0) )
= (hsm , g r , g x )

Fig. 3: Ownership initiation

– Auth: It is a general symmetric-key based authentication protocol. The current owner O(t,k) interacts the tag T using a pre-shared symmetric authentication key y. Once the authentication protocol outputs 1, the owner collects
the tag’s information inf o which includes the tag’s identity IDt , ownership
proof σ(t,k) , etc.
– Transfer: To transfer the ownership, the current owner O(t,k) interacts with
the new owner O(t,k+1) . If the current owner is a supplier, it follows the
description as in Fig.4. Otherwise, it follows the description as in Fig.5.
Assume that the identity of tags and public information of two owners are
mutually known.
– OwnerProve: To generate a proof of ownership, the current owner O(t,k) retrieves the proof Σ(t,k−1,k) = (s(t,k−1,k) , R(t,k−1,k) ) of authenticated transfer and the ownership poof σ(t,k−1) of owner O(t,k−1) . Computes s(t,k) =
s(t,k−1,k) + skk , where skk is the private key of O(t,k) , and sets the proof
σ(t,k) = (u(t,k) , v(t,k) , w(t,k) ) = (hs(t,k) , v(t,k−1) , R(t,k−1,k) ). In the case k = 1,
set v(t,1) = g rt , where g rt is from Fig.4.
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O(t,0) (α, g α )

O(t,1) (β, g β , g α )

r(t,0,1) ∈R Z∗p
R(t,0,1) = g r(t,0,1)
R(t,0,1)

−−−−−−−→
e(t,0,1) = H2 (R(t,0,1) , g β , IDt )
Y = g αe(t,0,1) R(t,0,1)
Y

←−−−−−−−
?

g αe(t,0,1) R(t,0,1) = Y
rt ∈R Z∗p , st = αet + rt
et = H1 (g rt , IDt )
s(t,0,1) = αe(t,0,1) + r(t,0,1) + st
s(t,0,1) ,g rt

−−−−−−−→
?

g s(t,0,1) = g αet g rt Y
Σ(t,0,1) = (s(t,0,1) , R(t,0,1) )

Fig. 4: Transfer from supplier to new owner

O(t,k) (skk , pkk , pks , Σ(t,k−1,k) )

O(t,k+1) (skk+1 , pkk+1 , pks )

r(t,k,k+1) ∈R Z∗p
et = H1 (v(t,k) , IDt )
r = r(t,k,k+1) + s(t,k−1,k)
R(t,k,k+1) = g r (pkset v(t,k) )−1
R(t,k,k+1)

−−−−−−−→

e

Y = pkk(t,k,k+1) R(t,k,k+1) , e(t,k,k+1)
= H2 (R(t,k,k+1) , pkk+1 , IDt )
Y

←−−−−−−−
e
?
pkk(t,k,k+1) R(t,k,k+1) =

Y
s(t,k,k+1) = skk e(t,k,k+1) + r
s(t,k,k+1)

−−−−−−−→
?

g s(t,k,k+1) = pkset v(t,k) Y
Σ(t,k,k+1) = (s(t,k,k+1) , R(t,k,k+1) )

Fig. 5: General transfer from current owner to new owner on level k
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– OwnerVerify: On input a proof σ(t,k) = (u(t,k) , v(t,k) , w(t,k) ) of tag T , there
are three cases. The verifier checks as follows
• Case 1 (k = 0):
e(t,0) = H2 (v(t,0) , w(t,0) , IDt ),

?

e

e(g, u(t,0) ) = e(pks (t,0) v(t,0) w(t,0) , h).

• Case 2 (k = 1):
et = H1 (v(t,1) , IDt ),

e(t,0,1) = H2 (w(t,1) , pk1 , IDt ),
et +e(t,0,1)

?

e(g, u1 ) = e(pks

pk1 v(t,1) w(t,1) , h).

• Case 3 (k > 1):
et = H1 (v(t,k) , IDt ),

e(t,k−1,k) = H2 (w(t,k) , pkk , IDt ),
e

?

(t,k−1,k)
e(g, u(t,k) ) = e(pkset pkk pkk−1
v(t,k) w(t,k) , h).

Outputs true if any equation holds, otherwise outputs f alse.
Correctness Without loss of generality, we show the correctness of our RFID
ownership transfer protocol in Case 3 as follows:
e(g, u(t,k) ) = e(g, hs(t,k−1,k) +skk )
= e(g, hskk−1 e(t,k−1,k) +r+skk ) )
e

(t,k−1,k) r
= e(pkk−1
g pkk , h)

e

(t,k−1,k) r
= e(pkset g rt pkk−1
g pkk (pkset g rt )−1 , h)

e

(t,k−1,k)
= e(pkset pkk pkk−1
v(t,k) w(t,k) , h).

5

Security Models of Ownership Transfer Protocols

The security of a RFID ownership transfer protocol usually relies on the underlining authentication protocols. It is extremely hard to provide the strong
security if a symmetric-key authentication protocol is employed. Typically, the
security model of symmetric-key based ownership transfer protocols does not
provide corruption oracle which outputs the state of a tag. Once the key is
exposed, the security of tag is completely compromised. Elkhiyaoui, Blass and
Molva [1] recently presented a ROTIV protocol secure against the key corruption. It applies the public key cryptography in the authentication while the tag
is only required to compute a hash function. However, the proposed security
model cannot capture the adversary who can rewrite the content of a tag. It is
possible when an adversary gains the key of tag. In this section, we enhance the
security models of ownership transfer protocols. A general assumption is that
owners are not able to launch collusion attacks in an ownership transfer [10].
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Adversaries and Oracles

The ability of the adversary is essentially restricted by the actions that he is
allowed to carry out. In security models, we specify the actions of adversary
via the oracle queries. We now define the oracles which are used in the security
models of ownership transfer protocols in this paper.
Definition 2 (Oracles). The adversary plays with a challenger by given public
information of the system and the following oracle calls.
– (O, pk) ← SetupOwner(ID): Taking as input an identity ID, it creates an
owner O and runs the algorithm KeyGen to output a public key pk.
– T ← TagInit(IDt ): Creates a tag T with the identity IDt and sets the authentication key y. It runs the algorithm TagInit and outputs the tag T .
– (IDt , σ(t,k) ) ← Auth(T, Ok ): Taking as input a current owner Ok and a tag
T , it outputs the identity IDt of tag and its ownership proof σ(t,k) if T is
valid, outputs ⊥ otherwise.
– c ← CorruptTag(T ): Taking as input a tag T , and outputs the complete
internal state c of T . Note that the oracle does not destroy the tag T and the
tag is available in the future oracle calls.
– sk ← CorruptOwner(ID): Taking as input an owner’s identity ID, and outputs the private key sk of the owner.
– {0, 1} ← Rewrite(T, c0 , y): Taking as input a tag T , a new state c0 and an
authentication key y, it rewrites the state by c0 and outputs 1 if the key is
valid, 0 otherwise.
– σ(t,k) ← OwnerProve(T, IDs , IDk−1 , IDk ): Taking as input a tag T , an identity IDs of supplier, an identity IDk−1 of previous owner and an identity
IDk of current owner, it outputs an ownership proof σ(t,k) of the tag.
– Σ(t,k,k+1) ← Transfer(T, IDk , IDk+1 ): Taking as input a tag T , an identity
IDk of current owner and an identity IDk+1 of new owner, it outputs an
authenticated ownership transfer proof Σ(t,k,k+1) of the tag.
Definition 3 (Type I and Type II adversary). The adversary is defined by
the oracle calls and the goal of the experiment.
– Type I Adversary(AI ): is also allowed to query all above oracles except the
CorruptOwner. It aims to output a valid proof of authenticated transfer which
cannot be detected during the transfer.
– Type II Adversary(AII ): is allowed to query all above oracles. It aims to output
a valid proof of ownership of the target tag which cannot be detected in the
ownership verification.
5.2

Security Models

We define the security models of ownership transfer protocols in this section.
Each model captures the capability of different adversaries. A security model is
defined as an experiment which plays between the adversary and the challenger.

Secure RFID Ownership Transfer Protocols
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We denote that the security parameters as r, s and n, which are respectively
the number of owner initiations, the number of oracle calls and the number of
tag initiations. There are two experiments defined in our security model. An
RFID ownership transfer protocol is secure iff it is secure in both experiments.
The security models defined in this section are suitable to ownership transfer
protocols in the two-party model.
Security Against Type I Attack Type I adversary is a person who attempts
to forge a valid proof of authenticated transfer. AI interacts with the challenger
via oracle calls and outputs a proof of transfer. It is described as in experiment
Expsecure
AI ,S [r, s, n] in Fig.6.

Experiment Expsecure
AI ,S [r, s, n]:
– Setup: The challenger runs the algorithm Setup to generate public parameters
params and returns to AI . It initiates a supplier S ∗ .
– Phase 1(Learning):
• AI can query all above oracles except CorruptOwner to C.
• Outputs two sets T = {T1 , . . . , Tn } and O = {O1 , . . . , Or }, which are
created tags and owners.
– Phase 2(Forge):
∗
• AI submits a target tag T∗ ∈ T , current owner Ok∗ and new owner Ok+1
∗
∗
∗
to C, such that (Ok , Ok+1 ) ∈ O ∪ {S }.
• AI queries oracles Auth, CorruptTag, Rewrite, Transfer and OwnerProof to
C.
• AI outputs a proof Σ ∗ of authenticated ownership transfer.
∗
Exp outputs success if true ← OwnershipVerify(IDt∗ , pks∗ , pkk∗ , pkk+1
, OwnerProve
∗
∗
(IDt∗ , skk+1
, Σ ∗ , σ ∗ )), such that Σ ∗ 8 T ransf er(IDt∗ , IDk∗ , IDk+1
).

Fig. 6: Type I security experiment of the ownership transfer protocols

Definition 4. An ownership transfer protocol is (r, s, n, )-secure against the
Type I attack, if any AI who succeeds in Expsecure
AI ,S [r, s, n] has advantage
Pr[success ← Expsecure
AI ,S [r, s, n]] ≤ ,
where  is negligible.
Security Against Type II Attack The Type II adversary acts as a person who
attempts to forge a valid proof of ownership. AII interacts with the challenger C
via oracle calls and outputs a proof of ownership at the end of the experiment.
The experiment Expsecure
AII ,S [r, s, n] is defined as in Fig. 7.
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Experiment Expsecure
AII ,S [r, s, n]:
– Setup:The challenger runs the algorithm Setup to generate public parameters
params and returns to AII . It initiates a supplier S ∗ .
– Phase 1(Learning):
• AII can query all above oracles to C.
• Outputs two sets T = {T1 , . . . , Tn } and O = {O1 , . . . , Or }, which are
created tags and owners.
– Phase 2(Forge):
• AII submits a target tag T∗ ∈ T , previous owner O∗k−1 and current owner
O∗k to C, such that (O∗k−1 , O∗k ) ∈ O ∪ {S ∗ }.
• AII queries oracles Auth, CorruptTag, Rewrite, Transfer and OwnerProve
to C.
• AII outputs a proof σ ∗ of ownership.
Exp outputs success if it satisfies the restrictions as follows,
∗
1. true ← OwnershipVerify(IDt∗ , pks∗ , pkk−1
, pkk∗ , σ ∗ ),
∗
∗
∗
∗
∗
2. σ 8 OwnerProve(IDt , IDs , IDk−1 , IDk ),
∗
∗
3. skk∗ 8 CorruptOwner(IDk∗ ) ∨ (Σ ∗ 8 Transfer(IDt∗ , IDk−1
, IDk∗ ) ∧ skk−1
8
∗
CorruptOwner(IDk−1 )).

Fig. 7: Type II security experiment of the ownership transfer protocols.

Definition 5. An ownership transfer protocol is (r, s, n, )-secure against the
Type II attack, if any AII who succeeds in Expsecure
AII ,S [r, s, n] has advantage
Pr[success ← Expsecure
AII ,S [r, s, n]] ≤ ,
where  is negligible.
Lemma 1. If an ownership transfer protocol is secure against the Type II attack,
it is secure against the Type I attack.
Due to the page limitation, the proof of Lemma 1 is referred to the full
version.

6

Security Analysis

An ownership transfer protocol is secure if it is against two types of attacks
defined in Section 5.2. Without loss of generality, we analyse the security of
proposed protocol on the k-th level. According to Lemma 1, we only show the
security proof of the proposed protocol in Type II experiment.
Theorem 1. The proposed ownership transfer protocol is (r, s, n, )-secure against
the Type II attack if the CDH assumption is held.
Due to the page limitation, the proof of Lemma 1 is referred to the full
version.
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Conclusion

In this paper, we defined a new secure model of ownership transfer protocols.
It enhances the existing security models. We provided a definition of RFID
ownership transfer and proposed a secure ownership transfer protocol. It achieves
a single verification key to all the tags from an owner. The protocol satisfies all
the security requirements. A formal proof of our proposed protocol was given.
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